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In this chapter I explore some of the roles of trust, mistrust, and distrust in deeply plural 
or diverse societies. Section One sets out the features of deeply diverse societies that 
provide the contexts of trust and distrust. Section Two proposes that social relationships 
in diverse societies need to have two qualities to be full of intersubjective trust (trustful) 
and, thus, worthy of trust (trustworthy) of the members of the relationships: cooperative 
and contestatory quality, and self-sustaining and co-sustaining quality. Section Three 
suggests that such trustful relationships are grounded in and draw on a second type of 
trust: pre-existing co-operational trust. Section Four argues that trustful relationships and 
co-operational trust are co-sustained by a third type of trust: an interactive ethics or ethos 
of trust of the members within which they exercise judgements of trust and mistrust. 
These three types of trust form a triad that sustains virtuous (autopoietic) systems of trust 
and peacefulness (nonviolence). Throughout the sections the features of virtuous systems 
of trust are contrasted with vicious systems of distrust.1 
 




1 SIX FEATURES OF DIVERSE SOCIETIES 
 
This section sets out the features of deeply diverse societies that provide the conditions of 
the modalities of trust, mistrust and distrust explored in the following sections. In this and 
the following sections I draw heavily on the ongoing research of the Group for Research 
on Plurinational Societies (GRSP) and associates.2 
First, GRSP studies societies composed of criss-crossing and overlapping social 
relationships that constitute multiple forms of association and identification: ways of life 
or cultures broadly speaking. There is not only a plurality of forms of association and 
identification of various kinds. They also overlap and interact in complex ways (complex 
or diverse pluralism). These associations include not only formal legal, political and 
economic associations such as states, indigenous and settler nations and nationalist 
movements, provinces, territories, municipalities, regions, corporations, cooperatives, 
unions, official minorities of various kinds, political parties, NGOs and voluntary 
associations. They also include informal associations and identifications, such as 
economic classes, persons with disabilities, persons of colour, racialized minorities, 
gender, sexual orientation, pan-indigenous decolonization networks, social and ecological 
movements of various kinds, the myriad local-global networked associations, and so on. 
Studying this multiplicity of forms of association and identification has brought into 
being and sustained a learning curve from the initial focus on big and powerful forms of 
association and identification to the growing awareness of the depth and diversity of other 
forms of association and identification within, across and alongside large majoritarian and 
minoritarian associations. 




 Second, to study the lived experience of this complex lifeworld is to study the 
interdependent and interactive relationships of power, knowledge, authority and identity 
formation of members, both within the overlapping associations and among associations. 
Through participation in these multiple relationships that govern our conduct we come to 
have the corresponding forms of self-formation and self-awareness (identity) of our 
subject positions in the various associations. These relational identities usually come 
along with stereotypical contrastive identities of the members of other associations. These 
relationships – whether formal or informal, direct or representative – are ‘relationships of 
governance’ in the general sense Foucault gave to this phrase. They govern the ways we 
(individually and collectively) recognize and interact with each other and, reciprocally, 
we govern each other through interacting in and over them. They are normalizing and 
normative. They are also accommodating or ‘federal’ relationships in an equally general 
sense and to varying degrees. That is, the diverse members of relationships of governance 
within and among associations inhabit the relationships they bear in diverse ways, just as 
in the specific case of legal federal relationships (Karmis and Norman 2005; Burgess and 
Gagnon 2010; Gagnon and Tully 2001). 
 Third, a central concern of GRSP is to study the dynamics of interaction within 
and over these relationships of cooperation. The dynamics of interaction include the many 
types and cycles of cooperation, contestation, reconciliation, cooperation and 
recontestation: for example, working together, grievance, dissent, protest, struggle, 
negotiation, conflict resolution or irresolution, implementation or non-implementation, 
review and beginning again. These are the agonistic and democratic activities of 
individual and collective subjects of these always imperfect relationships of governance 




through which these subjects become free, active and responsible co-agents of them, 
seeking to test them and, if necessary, negotiate their modification or transformation over 
generations as circumstances change and new injustices and social suffering come to 
light. They are carried out through the courts, parliaments, constitutional change, 
referenda, truth and reconciliation commissions, reasonable accommodation 
commissions, civil disobedience, boycotts, non-cooperation, revolution, enacting 
alternative ways of living socially and ecologically, and, at the ground of it all, the 
everyday negotiation of the relationships in which we live and interact, and on which we 
all interdepend.  Following Merleau-Ponty and Taylor, GRSP calls all these discursive 
and non-discursive (embodied) dynamics of interaction among humans and also non-
human forms of life ‘dialogical’ in a general and ontological sense, and then studies 
specific types of dialogical interactions (see Section 4.6). 
Fourth, although research began with the powerful actors and high profile contests 
over perceived injustices, it soon expanded to the expression or repression of voices of the 
powerless who were either outside and unrecognized by these contests or silenced within 
by the actors who claimed to represent them. It became obvious that appropriate forms of 
dialogical mutual recognition and participation of ‘all affected’ by the perceived injustice 
at issue are essential for reasons of justice, stability and trust. Running roughshod over the 
less powerful, presuming agreement or feigning consultation in each stage of the contest 
creates further injustices: non-recognition and mis-recognition. These generate distrust, 
resentment, enmity and further conflict. In a word, deep diversity joins hands with 
‘intersectionality’ (Dhamoon 2009; Maclure 2000; Murphy 2012). 




Fifth, among the ‘all affected’ by these human systems of social relationships are 
the ecosystems in which they are deeply embedded as subsystems and in which they are 
interdependent, yet which they are systematically destroying at an unprecedented rate 
(Brown 2011). Therefore, it is no longer possible to study systems of social relationships 
without studying their positive and negative interrelations and interactions on the 
ecological relationships on which they depend. The study of social relationships should 
thus include the study of socio-ecosystems. This insight joins together social and 
ecological justice (Rees 2010). Moreover, the deep diversity of ecosystems that has 
sustained life on earth for the last three billion years is similar in some respects to the 
diversity of human social systems. Thus, it may be possible to learn some lessons on how 
to design sustainable social systems and sustainable relationships of them to ecosystems 
from listening to and learning from how ecosystems have sustained life on earth (Capra 
2004; Rees 2010; Heinberg & Lerch 2010; Tully 2018a).  
Sixth, the conclusion GRSP, the Supreme Court of Canada and many others draw 
is that contests over social relationships of cooperation are a permanent feature of diverse 
social and socio-ecosystems in an imperfect world. Accordingly, nonviolent dialogical 
practices of civic engagement of all affected need to be built into the social relationships 
of free and democratic associations: that is, into the cycles of dissent, negotiation, 
implementation and openness to renewed dissent and negotiation. Since these practices 
are themselves systems of social relationships, they too must be open to contestation. 
Such practices of listening (audi alteram partem), ‘negotiation’ or ‘engagement’ (broadly 
defined) have come into increasing use in the last decades and they are another focus of 
research. For example, practices of citizen participation and consultation, mediation 




practices, participatory budgeting, deliberative democracy, treaty negotiations between 
indigenous peoples and settlers, the representation of damaged and threatened ecosystems 
in negotiations over resource development, the duty to consult across the private and 
public spheres of contemporary societies, practices of transitional and transformative 
justice in pre- and post-conflict situations, and new practices of engagement beyond 
consultation.3 
 In summary and transition, these are the demanding conditions under which any 
form of association and identification can present itself as a ‘we’ and exercise their 
constituent powers acceptably and fairly in circumstances of interdependent diversity. To 
exercise power together acceptably and fairly in these conditions, I will argue in the 
following sections, is to exercise it in trustful ways. Trust is the aspect of these social 
relationships that renders them ‘sociable’ (socialitas) rather than unsociable or anti-social. 
Trust ‘animates’ sociable relationships and the ethos of sociability of the participants. 
We can already see from the GRSP research summarised above that one primary 
quality of such sociable and trustable relationships is that power is exercised co-
operatively and agonistically (non-antagonistically) within associations and in co-
operation and contestation with other interdependent associations. This quality is 
examined in the next section. However, to see its importance it is necessary to be mindful 
of the premise on which it is based. This premise is the primacy of forms of 
interdependency that run through all six conditions of the complex lifeworld in which we 
live. Interdependence renders unacceptable and unfair the dominant modern 
understandings, theories, exercises and institutionalisation of agency, constituent power, 
representation, self-determination and sovereignty based on presumptively independent 




actors (such as states, governments, private corporations, peoples, movements, atomistic 
individuals). The living reality of these complex interdependent conditions is a pragmatic 
refutation of these dominant understandings. Indeed, as we see in the following sections, 
the exercise of power by self-presumptively independent agents in the face of diverse 
protests is the cause or exacerbation of the injustice and distrust that give rise to struggles 
over non-recognition and mis-recognition (Cf: Way et al. 2018; Marin 2017). 
If this is correct, then it is necessary to look beyond the dominant modern theories 
and institutions and the discordant dynamics of vicious interaction they generate or 
exacerbate, and look towards the deep diversity they misrecognize and the practices of 
civic engagement that are emerging in response.  Researchers should begin from within 
the actually existing contextual world of diverse interdependency and practitioners should 
set aside declarations of sovereign independence and work with declarations of 
interdependence-and-(negotiated relational) independence if they are to co-sustain 
fairness and trust within the conditions in which we live (Borrows 2002, 2016; Murphy 
2012; Nootens 2013; Oklopcic 2014). 
 
2 TWO QUALITIES OF TRUSTFUL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
This section examines two qualities of social relationships that make them trustful. These 
qualities are: (1) democratic, in the direct sense of co-operative and contestatory, and (2) 
federal, in the sense of self-sustaining and co-sustaining modes of living together. These 
two qualities help to generate and sustain intersubjective (relational) trust and well-being 
among the partners. These trustful relationships are co-dependent on co-operational trust 




and the trustful and truthful ethos of the partners. These three components are examined 
in three separate sections so it can be seen how each contributes to co-generating and co-
sustaining virtuous social systems.4 
The different dynamics of interdependent interaction begin in everyday encounters 
in relationships of deep diversity. These are more interdependent than is often realized. 
They are not strategic relationships between two separate, distrustful actors who see each 
other as instruments to be manipulated. They are also not encounters in which two 
separate actors recognize each other as free and equal subjects and exchange reasons in 
conditions of secure mutual trust. Before these reflective, secondary representations of 
human interaction are imposed over the relationship, the partners are already in more 
basic, non-reflective and often non-linguistic, perceptual and dialogical relationships of 
interdependency and interaction from birth onward. Following Merleau-Ponty, let us call 
this primary, embodied perceptual dialogue we are always in with the human and non-
human world through our senses (synaesthesia) ‘perceptual interdependency’ (Abram 
1997, Harding 2013). This is how Mary Parker Follett introduced it into the social 
sciences and the study of diversity and conflict in the 1920s (Follett 1924: 62): 
 
I never react to you but to you-plus-me; or to be more accurate, it is I-plus-you 
reacting to you-plus-me. “I” can never influence “you” because you have already 
influenced me; that is, in the very process of meeting, by the very process of 
meeting, we both become something different. It begins even before we meet, in the 
anticipation of meeting. On physiological, psychological and social levels… 
response is always to a relating. Accurately speaking the matter cannot be expressed 




even in the phrase used above, I-plus-you meeting you-plus-me. It is I plus the-
interweaving-between-you-and-me meeting you plus the-interweaving-between-
you-and-me, etc., etc. This pregnant truth – that response is always to a relation, 
the relation between the response and that to which the response is being made – is 
the basic truth for all social sciences (my italics). 
 
This complex, reciprocal and cyclical perceptual interdependency of interweaving and 
interplay is constitutive of the intersubjective experience of being-with others. Whether 
the partners generate trustful and peaceful relationships through virtuous cycles of 
reciprocal interaction or distrustful and aggressive relationships through vicious cycles of 
antagonism depends in part on whether they become aware of this interweaving of their 
identities in the course of their interactions or whether they hold fast to atomism: the false 
belief that their individual and collective identities exist prior to and independent of 
encounter and interaction.  
Given the deep forms of interdependency in deeply diverse societies and the 
demands for practices of civic participation in response to their unfairness and 
unacceptability, it seems to follow that a trustful relationship would have the following 
two qualities. 
 
2.1 Democratic, cooperation and contestation 
 
First, the relationship would invite and enable the members to participate in the co-
operation of the relationship and in the contestation and negotiation of the practices and 




institutions of co-operation in their diverse ways (Tully 2018a: 291-317; Wiener 2014). 
As GRSP researchers have argued, this relationship of cooperation and contestation is 
considerably more than having an opinion about the relationship, exchanging opinions in 
the public sphere in hopes of influencing representatives, engaging in protests to try to 
catch the attention of our governors, voting from time to time, and other devices of 
representative citizenship. It is also more than the ‘co-ordination’ of interaction. All 
affected are invited to have a say and a hand in the actual co-operation of the 
relationships among them: discussing-with, negotiating-with and exercising power-with 
each other. It is thus a ‘democratic’ relationship in the participatory sense of ‘democracy’ 
as a form of association in which the people themselves (demos) exercise the powers of 
self-government together (kratos). The members are not only subjects of the relationship 
but also engaged citizens/authors of it. 
This type of co-operative and contestatory relationship brings into being and 
sustains a unique type of power relationship: power-with. To say all ‘have a say and a 
hand’ is just to say that they participate in co-organising and co-exercising nonviolent 
relationships of power with each other. They co-operate and co-contest their relationships 
as they carry on. This directly democratic type of power relationship is as old as the first 
self-organising human community and as recent as the global proliferation of cooperative, 
‘horizontal’ associations of associations today (Tully 2014a: 3-102; Ouziel 2015). It is the 
everyday type of power relationship that, in countless varieties, creates and sustains 
society and sociability, and underlies all other types of power relationship. Although 
ubiquitous, it is often overridden, degraded and overlooked by two predominant types of 
power relationship that are based on the often violent separation of interdependent 




humans into rulers and ruled, or governors and governed, and the establishment of power-
over relationships (Arendt 2005; Tully 2018b). 
The first type of power-over is modelled on victory over another in a war or 
violent struggle (power as violence or force) or on non-democratic law-making and law-
enforcing (power as coercion). One actor exercises power over others in a relationship of 
command and obedience. In this juridical and military model of power-over the subjects 
have no say or hand in the co-exercise of power-with others. They are dis-empowered on 
the presumption that they have consented to delegate their powers of self-government to 
those with power over them. If the subjects wish to have a say, they have to do so outside 
the power relationship; in the public sphere, voting, going to court, protest, civil 
disobedience, and so on. They cannot have practices of civic participation in the 
relationships by which they are governed directly without beginning to transform the 
relationship itself into a power-with relationship.  
The second type of power-over relationship is the strategic hegemon-subaltern 
relationship between unequal partners.  Modelled on the logic of warfare, the more 
powerful actor or actors permit the weaker actor or actors to have a limited say and hand 
in the relationship and to exercise some constrained powers of self-government; but the 
hegemon retains, or, more accurately, interacts to retain, the final say and upper hand. The 
hegemon either profits from the exploitation, insecurity and arms-and-surveillance race of 
continuing this unequal game (informal imperialism) or, if this becomes too costly, 
dreams of imposing a command-obedience relationship once and for all. The subalterns, 
if they play the game, try to get what they want through servility, flattery and toadying; or 
to overthrow and replace the boss; or simply to escape. If they wish to transform the game 




into a power-with relationship, they non-cooperate and self-organize co-operative 
associations of collective action and regime change (Tully 2018b).   
Although these two types of power-over relationship are predominant, power-with 
relationships exist in informal relationships of everyday life to varying degrees. 
Associations of co-operative and contestatory relationships permeate activities of working 
together, interacting and resolving disputes nonviolently both within and around the 
public and private spheres of institutionalised power-over relationships (Sennett 2012). 
This was Kropotkin’s great insight in opposition to both Marxism and liberal capitalism at 
the beginning of the twentieth century (Kropotkin 2006). More recently Arendt argued 
that, while the dominant power-over governance relationships systematically degrade the 
power-with relationships that sustain human communities, they parasitically dependent on 
them (to repair the damage they do to human communities), and thus collapse without 
them (Arendt 1970). 
In almost any situation in contemporary societies all three types of relationship are 
present. However, the authority of power-over relationships, insofar as they are 
authoritative, is not based primarily on the will of the sovereign, the expertise of the 
commander, the imperative quality of commands, the force to enforce commands, the 
superior strategy of the hegemon, or even the force to protect. All these 
misrepresentations conflate power with force and violence and thereby conceal the 
intersubjective world of power-with. Insofar as a power-over relationship is authoritative, 
its authority derives from the way the governor relates to the governed and from the 
processes of authorization through which power is conditionally delegated and 
authorized, as Laden has shown (Laden 2012, 2014a; Luxon 2013). When these features 




are absent, its authority ‘dissolves’, force replaces legitimate power-over, and power 
reverts to the people who conditionally delegated it to their representative. They then 
exercise it directly, in the form of power-with, as Locke classically argued and successful 
revolutions since Locke have substantiated (Tully 1993: 9–70). This shows the primacy of 
power-with relationships.5  
 The principle that ‘all affected’ should have a say and hand as much as humanly 
possible simply extends power-with relationships from within associations to relationship 
among them. Hence, the meaning of ‘all affected’ is that everyone affected is a ‘relation’ 
or ‘relative’: the bearer of a relationship of interdependency. This follows from the dense 
types of interdependency in conditions of deep diversity. ‘We are all connected,’ and ‘all 
affected’ are ‘all my relations’ or my ‘neighbours’. There are countless gradations of 
relatives and countless ways of grading them; but there is no affected other who is not in 
some sense a member of this global family or federation of interdependent beings. There 
is no other who is different in kind: no one who is not a kin to be approached with 
kindness. None of the familiar binaries of modern political thought apply: friend-enemy, 
civilized-savage, inside-outside, and so on. We are not first abstract and separate 
individuals, nations, corporations, states, peoples, species, civilizations, with or without 
universal rights and duties, who then decide to consent to treat each other as friends or 
enemies, insiders or outsiders, and act accordingly. We are always already interdependent 
members of the human ‘family’ in dense relationships of kinship, as the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights puts it. Overlooking this feature is one of the primary 
injustices of modern, independence-based political thought and practice (Tully 2018a). 




 Like the general principle of ‘do unto others’ from which it derives, the principle 
of ‘all affected’ is not prescription, but, rather, an ideal and general orientation to conflict 
and resolution. It cannot possibly be operationalised perfectly to every affected person 
and association of present or future generations in cases of any complexity. All responses 
in real time and circumstances will be less than perfect – works in progress. Accordingly, 
the orientation enjoins the actors to be as inclusive as possible in coming to a resolution 
and to ensure that the resolution is always open to disagreement, dissent, recontestation 
and re-negotiation in the future by those who were not properly included. Hence the 
equiprimordiality of both cooperation and contestation under this orientation: that is, 
agonistic democracy (Tully 2008a: 291–316; 2008b: 91–124; Simpson and Tully 2012; 
and see Section 4.6–8). 
I hope this brief analysis shows that this type of power relationship is an essential 
feature of living together peacefully and trustfully in the conditions of interdependence 
and deep diversity. It invites and enables members of all kinds of associations to co-
operate and contest in their relationships in ways that appear to be fair and acceptable to 
them. It is well known that this type of relationship generates and sustains mutual respect 
and trust among the members, as long as they adopt the corresponding ethos. But this is 
not all (Murphy 2012).  
It is manifestly also a trustful relationship – full of intersubjective trust. It is the 
type of relationship that trusts its members to cooperate and contest together in 
conciliatory and trusting ways; ways that reciprocally sustain the democratic relationship 
between them. By inviting and enabling this kind of participation the relationship literally 
gives its members ‘the gift of intersubjective trust’. The dimension of intersubjective trust 




animates the relationship and helps to generate solidarity among members. We can say 
that the participants are ‘in intersubjective relationships of trust’ in co-operating and 
contesting. This shared ground of intersubjective trust makes possible the various types of 
subjective trust, mistrust and distrust of the participants as they co-operate and contest 
(Section 4). 
 
2.2 Federal self-sustaining and co-sustaining freedom 
 
The second quality of a trustful relationship of cooperation and contestation in conditions 
of diversity is its federal quality. This quality derives from the old adage that if diverse 
people wish to live in peace and security they need to learn to get along with their 
neighbours. Federal relationships, in the way that they have been developed by GRSP, are 
the response to this need. The democratic quality of the relationship invites and enables 
all affected, and thus all neighbours, to participate, and to do so in their own diverse ways 
(Tierney forthcoming). This is standardly conceived as a federal relationship of ‘self-rule 
and shared ruled’. While this is important, there is another aspect of federal relationships 
of equal importance and often overlooked: the dual quality of the members’ ways of life 
being self-sustaining and co-sustaining. 
This dual sustainability quality enables and frees the members to co-operate in the 
association in accord with their own diverse ways of life and to contest the federal 
relationships if they impose a dominating, colonizing, subordinating or assimilative 
relationship over them. Simultaneously, the reciprocal responsibility of all members is to 
organise and sustain their own diverse (political, economic, cultural) ways of life in such 




a way that, through their cooperative and contestatory interdependency, interaction and 
mutual accommodation, their ways of life also co-sustain the diverse ways of the lives of 
their neighbours.  
This unique dual quality of self-sustaining and co-sustaining is definitive of 
federalism in conditions of interdependency. It is the meaning of the concepts ‘symbiosis’ 
(living together) and ‘symbiogenesis’ (creating new federal systems through living 
together). The term ‘symbiosis’ originally developed to describe the ways different 
human communities learned to cooperate and co-sustain each other prior to the modern 
state system. It was transferred to the life sciences where it is now used to describe how 
the diverse and interdependent forms of life on earth have co-evolved and become more 
complex over the last three billion years by sustaining themselves in ways that co-sustain 
other interdependent forms of life. The general idea is the same for human systems (Capra 
2004: 230–1). Sustaining the associations to which one belongs in ways that co-sustain 
the associations they affect and on which their well-being is interdependent go hand in 
hand. 
This kind of federal relationship was famously described by Marx as “an 
association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all” (Marx and Engels 1998: 26). Marx used it in contrast to his depiction 
of the antagonistic relationships of mutual distrust and exploitation of states, corporations, 
classes and individuals in the global capitalist system. He was mistaken in believing that a 
war between capital and labour and the seizing of power-over would bring such an 
interdependent association of associations into being. Class warfare continues 
antagonistic command-obedience and strategic relationships into the new regime. It was 




Kropotkin who renamed these federal relationships of free association and development 
“co-operative” relationships of “mutual aid” or “mutual care.” He showed that they 
already exist all around us in thousands of voluntary associations of diverse kinds despite 
the dominance of competitive states and corporations: “another world is not only possible 
but actual” (Kropotkin 2006). This influential thesis has been the basis of co-operative 
associations and global federalism-from-below ever since (Restakis 2010). Gagnon gives 
a picture of this complex associational freedom and co-development in Canada today 
(Gagnon 2012). 
This unique type of federal relationship of mutual aid is interpreted by indigenous 
peoples as the gift-recognition-gratitude-reciprocity relationship or, simply, gift-
reciprocity. Each member’s way of life is organized in such a way that it does no harm to 
its neighbours and provides some goods or services that help to sustain them. The 
neighbours recognize this gift as a gift and experience the emotion of gratitude. Gratitude 
moves and freely obliges the recipients to reciprocate by giving their gifts of mutual aid to 
the same or other neighbours; thus setting in motion a virtuous gift-reciprocity cycle that 
co-sustains all relatives.  
This view of sustainable social systems is manifested in the Potlatch system of the 
Northwest Coast and in the international system of treaty negotiations and treaty 
federalism between indigenous and settler nations throughout North America (Asch 
2014). The negotiations always begin with the exchange of gifts so the parties are mindful 
of the type of relationship they are negotiating. Moreover, Indigenous peoples insist that 
they did not invent this system. Rather, like life and earth scientists today, they observe 
the gift-reciprocity relationship in the symbiotic and symbiogenetic ecological 




relationships of interdependency that co-sustain and co-evolve non-human forms of life, 
and they learn from this how human associations should relate to each other (Mills 2018; 
Tully2018a).     
This kind of federal relationship among diverse ways of human life is mutually 
beneficial in yet another way. Through their interactions the members learn of the diverse 
practices of their neighbours, borrow and trade practices and inventions with each other, 
and interpret and use them in new ways in their own cultures. These federal interactions 
initiate and sustain processes of cross-cultural ‘diffusion’ and more complex networks of 
interdependency and co-evolution, and these processes work against the counter-tendency 
to separation, distrust and antagonism.6 
 Finally, ecological and social systems of self-sustaining and co-sustaining federal 
relationships are ‘far from equilibrium’ and prone to tipping points. Countless species 
become aggressive rather than conciliatory, destroy the species and ecosystems on which 
they depend and thereby destroy themselves. Many human civilizations and sub-systems 
have done the same. We have known since the 1970s that the aggressive political and 
economic social systems that have become dominant over the last four hundred years (the 
Anthropocene) are doing the same today: bringing about the sixth mass extinction of 
hundreds of thousands of species and ecosystems and destroying the conditions that 
sustain human life. However, it is important to realize that the more predominant form of 
living system in the course of the co-evolution of life over three billions years, and over 
the last 200,000 years of Homo-sapiens, has been the self-sustaining and co-sustaining 
form, or life would not have survived (Dilworth 2012; Wilson 2013; Gandhi 2009: 89). 




This self-sustaining and co-sustaining federal quality of interdependent social 
relationships complements and strengthens the intersubjective trust generated by the 
democratic quality. It gives the trust relationship substantial content.  It is the trustful and 
trustworthy quality that enables the partners to co-survive and co-evolve together. These 
two qualities are not only possible, but actual in various degrees in the lived experience of 
complex human associations in so far as intersubjective trust exists within and among 
them. For example, at its best, Webber argues, the Canadian constitutional federation, in 
all its historical deep diversity and complexity, manifests these qualities in varying 
degrees (Webber 2015).  
 
3 THE CO-OPERATIONAL GROUNDS OF TRUSTFUL INTERACTIONS 
 
Just as doubt presupposes some intersubjective propositions that are not in doubt; 
disagreement presupposes intersubjective agreement on some background propositions in 
which we tacitly trust; and contestation presupposes some intersubjective cooperation; so 
too subjective and reflective judgments and acts of trust, mistrust and distrust presuppose 
some degree of background, intersubjective trustfulness that is taken for granted and goes 
without saying in the reflective activities (Lagerspetz and Hertzberg 2013). In addition to 
the two intersubjective qualities of trust in Section Two, there is a complementary type of 
tacit intersubjective trust: co-operational trust.  
 Biologically, trust, as Maturana explains, “is the spontaneous manner of being of 
any living system when in comfortable congruence with the medium. When this 
comfortable congruence disappears, another manner of relating comes to the fore, and we 




distinguish fear, doubt, or aggression, rather than trust.” In the case of humans, he 
continues (Maturana 2008: 214–5):  
 
[A] baby is born in the operational trust that there is a world ready to satisfy in love 
and care all that he or she may require for his or her living, and is therefore not 
helpless. And, indeed, if the baby is received in the manner that fulfils that trust, 
both the baby and the mother (and other members of the family) are in natural well-
being. 
 
This co-operational trust is not only trust in the dialogical relationships of mutual love 
and kindness between baby and caregiver, but also in the “medium” of ecological gift-
reciprocity relationships we saw in the previous section – the “biosphere and cosmos to 
which we belong as natural members of the animal world” (Ibid).  
 Co-operational or caring trust is the culturally diverse form of non-reflective, 
embodied know-how or savoir-faire (or savoir-vivre) that a baby tacitly acquires 
through the loving care of his or her caregivers. This practical know-how grows with the 
child and enables him or her to learn how to participate interactively in social 
relationships throughout life (Maturana 2010: 215): 
 
When a child is loved, and he or she must be loved at least by one adult person, he 
or she exhibits the embodied knowledge of our biological constitution as Homo 
sapiens-amans [loving or caring humanness], and becomes an active basic 
participant in the recursive systemic conservation of the biology of love. 





In these loving relationships a child acquires the abilities to play the many childhood 
games of cooperation and contestation, agreement and disagreement, trust and mistrust 
that enable him or her to play the adult games in the same conciliatory and, if necessary, 
reconciliatory spirit. 
 In contrast, much of human suffering arises through the loss of tacit co-operational 
trust through the disruption and distortion of the systemic coherences of human and 
ecological relationships and the irruption of distrust, fear, and aggression (Maturana 
2008: 215): 
 
Our patriarchal culture, in its continuous and insisting penetration into child 
upbringing through its demands on both mothers and children for competition and 
success, and through its glorification of violence and aggression, interferes with the 
biology of love in the mother/child relation and in the child’s growth into 
adulthood. As a result, mistrust, aggression, and arrogance become the main 
generators of anti-social behavior in modern life as they totally contradict love, 
which is the emotion that constitutes social living (my italics). 
 
When this occurs systematically, during childhood and later, as in patriarchal modern 
society, the erosion of co-operational trust and its virtuous social systems is overridden 
or replaced by anti-social and aggressive behaviour and the vicious social systems it 
generates and sustains: Homo-sapiens-aggressans (anti-social aggressiveness) 




(Maturana 2008: 84–140; Cf: Gilligan 2018). On this view, therefore, co-operational 
trust in relationships is the ground of humanness and sociability. 
 In so far as humans acquire co-operational trust savoir-faire in childhood, they 
bring it with them into many everyday social relationships beyond the family and often 
persist in projecting it over disruptions that arise, drawing on its nonviolent means of 
dispute resolution to resolve them (Gandhi 2009: 88–99). These are the informal 
cooperative social systems of mutual aid and nonviolent contestation that sustain 
communities and relations among communities (Shiva 2005). They persist even when 
they are dominated and nearly destroyed by the larger social systems of ruthless 
competition, exploitation, ecological destruction, aggressive behavior, imprisonment, 
violent video games and endless wars that feed parasitically on their social capital 
(Solnit 2012). Furthermore, in their daily activities humans also non-reflectively 
‘project’ this primary mode of being-with-others onto direct and mediated social 
relationships with complete strangers; treating them trustingly, unless and until this tacit 
trust is disrupted. If this were not the case, if distrust were primary, we would be unable 
to engage in these daily activities (Hawley 2012: 1). Finally, as above, every breath and 
step we take, and every drink of water and taste of food rests on the tacit co-operational 
trust provided as gifts by the ecosystems of the living earth that are good for us and take 
care of us, unless and until we learn otherwise (Commoner 1974).  
 This embodied co-operational trust is known by many names in different 
traditions: mutual love, interbeing, care, biophilia, ahimsa, caritas, philia, compassion, 
friendship, neighbourliness, kindness, and so on. My point is that it is a basic kind of 
intersubjective and interactive trust we have as earthlings and human beings. If I am not 




mistaken, it is drawn on, developed and transformed in the two qualities of 
intersubjective relationships of trust. It also plays a similar basic role in the 
complementary subjective ethos of the members of these relationships: the ethos of 
trust. 
 
4 THE ETHOS OF NONVIOLENT TRUSTFULNESS 
 
The third and final source of virtuous social systems of trust is the members’ ethos of 
trust that corresponds to and complements the two qualities of relationships of 
intersubjective trustfulness and draws on and develops the savoir-faire of tacit co-
operational trust. This ethos of trust completes, co-enacts and co-sustains virtuous social 
systems. It is the ground of individual epistemic and ethical judgments and action of 
trust and mistrust within them. 
 An ethics or ethos in this sense is an embodied mode-of-being-in-the-world-with-
diverse-others. It is grounded in the non-reflective co-operational trust savoir-faire of the 
previous section, but goes beyond it in many respects. Ethics or ethos in this sense is a 
particular kind of embodied non-reflective and reflective, non-linguistic and linguistic, 
perceptual and conceptual, participatory dialogue in and with the lifeworld – of becoming 
aware of the affects of one’s actions and interactions on all of one’s relations. “In other 
words”, Maturana suggests, “ethics is a network of doings and emotioning in which the 
care and concern for the consequences of one’s actions on others is present in what one 
does, and one acts in a way that entails accepting the consequences of that care and 
concern” (Maturana 2008: 181). Ethos or ethics in this sense comprises the modes of 




inhabiting social and ecological relationships in virtuous ways (Tully 2018b). It not only 
sustains existing trustful relationships. It also enables the members to prevent these 
relationships from tipping over into systematically distrustful relationships. Furthermore, 
it is the means by which vicious systems of distrust can be transformed into virtuous 
systems of trust. 
 It is a trusting ethos in the present continuous sense that it takes trustful 
relationships and co-operational trust as the ongoing ground of humanness and 
sociability. It is a settled mode of being – of trusting in one’s relationship with oneself 
and others. The whole ethos is an initiatory gift to others that awakens gratitude and 
invites reciprocity (Macy and Johnstone 2012; Mansbridge 1999; Laden 2013). Prior to 
and more important than recognition, it says to another that they are ‘welcome.’ It is 
universally manifest in an outstretched open hand in contrast to the taunt closed fist. But 
it is not trusting in an idealistic, abstract or foolhardy way. It accepts the inevitability of 
vulnerability, uncertainty, conflict, suffering, injustice, unfairness, distrust, manipulation, 
force and fraud. Indeed, it invites and enables others to bring these ills to the awareness of 
all affected and to address to them. Yet it does so in a distinctive way. Like all ethics, this 
one requires the cultivation of certain qualities of character and conduct. These are the 
qualities that show to others that the person is trustworthy; not manipulative, threatening, 
or counterfeiting trustworthiness. The central qualities are, as Gandhi exemplified, 
trustfulness, peacefulness, truthfulness (parrhesia), compassion, empathy, 
conciliatoriness, courage, receptivity, and perseverance in the face of distrust and 
violence (Gregg 2018: 49-72; Tully 2018c: xxxiii-li).  
 




4.1 Means and Ends 
 
Beyond the qualities of character, the first and perhaps most important feature of the 
trusting ethos is the relation between means and ends. It is based on the realization that 
the ways employed to respond to conflict, suffering and injustice must themselves 
manifest the ends they are employed to bring about. The reason for this is that many 
means and ends are internally related: means are pre-figurative and constitutive of ends to 
a large degree. Thus, just as a plant grows from an appropriate seed, peace is brought 
about by the seeds of peaceful means, democratic relationships by democratic means, and 
trustful relationships are brought about in conditions of distrust by trusting means – by 
means that manifest a trustful ethos. There is no way ‘to’ peace and trust; peace and trust 
are the way: means are autotelic (they manifest and bring about the ends) (Gandhi 2009: 
80–1; Huxley 1946; Arendt 1970; Gregg in Tully 2018c: xxxv).  
This autotelic view of means and ends has been developed over the last two 
hundred years in response to the failures of the dominant view that means are 
instrumentally and contingently related to ends, and, thus, evil means can and often must 
be used to bring about good ends. This view, promoted by Hobbes, Kant, Darwin, Freud 
and their many followers, is based on the rejection of the premise that humans are 
naturally sociable and trustable. Rather, on this influential version, humans are asserted to 
be naturally anti-social: separate, antagonistic, untrustworthy and insecure, and thus in a 
natural state of war with each other. Given these conditions, radical distrust is prior to 
trust. Accordingly, in Kant’s words, “man is an animal who needs a master” who 
coercively imposes a structure of command-obedience legal and economic relationships 




over others by means of war (and other vicious forms of antagonism such as “enviously 
competitive vanity and insatiable desires for possession or even power”). Wars of 
conquest and expansion gradually spread the modern state-form of structures of laws 
around the world over societies that do not have the state form and thus are in a state of 
war. This civilizing process progressively provides the necessary “guarantee” of peace, 
security and trust in some distant future (Kant 2009). The two instrumental means-ends 
dogmas of modernization follow from this general structure of argument: war and war-
preparation are the means to bring about and protect peace and security; and the 
authoritarian imposition of command-obedience relationships is the necessary means to 
bring about representative government and mutual trust within states and eventually 
between them. States retain the right to prepare and go to war but only for self-defence.  
Rather than bringing about a world of peace, security and trust, we now know 
from four centuries of experience that this system of distrustful and violent means 
generates a security dilemma (or distrust dilemma) that produces and reproduces the 
vicious, interlocking military-industrial systems and cycles of war-preparation, war, 
violence and counter-violence, and more war preparation. This is the constitutive 
‘security dilemma’ at the centre of the modern world system of international relations 
between sovereign states. Nietzsche was among the first to show why the system does not 
bring about peace.7 It is worth quoting in full because it captures the initiation and logic 
of interaction of vicious systems of distrust and aggressiveness, not only among states, 
but among distrustful actors of many kinds (Nietzsche 1986: 380–1). 
 




No government nowadays admits that it maintains an army so as to satisfy 
occasional thirst for conquest: the army is supposed to be for defence. But that 
means to reserve morality to oneself and to accuse one’s neighbour of immorality, 
since he has to be thought of as ready for aggression and conquest if our own state 
is obliged to take thought of means of self-defence; moreover, when our neighbour 
denies any thirst for aggression just as heatedly as our state does, and protests that 
he too maintains an army only for reasons of legitimate self-defence, our 
declaration of why we require an army declares our neighbour a hypocrite and 
cunning criminal who would be only too happy to pounce upon a harmless and 
unprepared victim and subdue him without a struggle.  
This is how all states confront one another: they presuppose an evil disposition in 
their neighbour and a benevolent disposition in themselves. This presupposition, 
however, is a piece of inhumanity as bad as, if not worse than, a war would be; 
indeed, fundamentally it already constitutes an invitation to and cause of wars, 
because, as aforesaid, it imputes immorality to one’s neighbour and thereby seems 
to provoke hostility and hostile acts on his part.  
 
That is, the presupposition of distrust generates a vicious dynamic of interaction of 
deepening distrust, insecurity, aggressiveness, violence and counter-violence, and more 
war and war-preparation in times of ‘peace’ that is then said to be the solution to the 
distrust and insecurity the first step generates. Moreover, the power-over relationships, 
aggressive ethos and strategic thinking constitutive of the military-industrial complex 
deeply influence the ethos of the members of the societies involved. The members of the 




most violent societies tend to become the most insecure, distrustful, fearful and 
aggressive in their own relationships. Radical distrust appears to them as the human 
condition, thereby re-affirming the necessity of the vicious system and causing them to 
overlook and erode the background, intersubjective, co-operational trust that makes social 
life possible (the boomerang or blowback-effect of militarisation). When peace activists, 
such as Tolstoy, Einstein, Russell, Gandhi and Huxley point this out, defenders of the 
system, such as Freud, reply that their ‘discontents’ with the present seeming lack of 
progress are a sign of weakness and that we all must stay the course of ‘savage wars of 
peace’ for the peace and trust that we must believe is to come in some distant future 
(Freud 2002). For, as Kant argues, these vicious means are what ‘nature herself’ employs 
to move humanity from a savage world of distrust to a moral world of trust (Kant 2009: 
108). More war, distrust and war preparation follow.  
 The lesson to be learned is an old one: distrust begets distrust and violence begets 
violence. According to Nietzsche, as also Jesus and Gandhi, the only way to break out of 
a vicious system of distrust is, first, to become aware that the whole system rests on a 
radical disposition of distrust: “the so-called armed peace such as now parades about in 
every country is a disposition to fractiousness which trusts neither itself nor its neighbour 
and fails to lay down its arms half out of hatred, half out of fear.” The next steps are to 
realise that “the means to real peace … must always rest on a disposition for peace” and 
for the strongest to enact this disposition of peace and trust by renouncing violence as the 
means of self-defence and unilaterally disarming: “we shall shatter the sword – and 
demolish it entire military machine down to its last foundations.” The “supreme maxim” 
that one must live in order to move from the dispositional ethos of distrust and violence to 




the ethos of trust and nonviolence is: “better to perish than to fear and hate, and twofold 
better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared ” (Nietzsche 1986: 380–1). That is, 
in my terms, one must always be prepared to resist the siren songs of fear and hatred of 
the latest enemy; to reach out to the other with an open hand rather than a closed fist; and 
to present them with the gift of trust if we wish to initiate a reciprocal virtuous system of 
reciprocal nonviolent cooperation and contestation. Trust begets trust and nonviolent 
contestation begets nonviolent contestation. 
 Although Nietzsche’s analysis of the dynamic of distrust is of enduring 
importance, we know much more today about wars among unequal states and state-
seeking actors (civil wars, violent revolutions, terrorist movements) and about the global 
military-industrial-political-media complexes and arms races that support them. In the 
1960s Arendt and others argued decisively that the vicious global system is irrational and 
tending towards mutual destruction; that it is based on distrust and the false premise that 
evil means lead to good ends; and that the only alternative is the politics of nonviolence 
(Arendt 1970). Since then, we have learned much more about the power of nonviolence to 
overthrow unjust regimes and to replace the politics of violence and counter-violence 
(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Tully 2014b: 238–48; Gregg 2018; and section 4.3).   
 
4.2 Inviting and enabling dissent 
 
As we saw with regard to the first quality of virtuous relationships in Section 2, the first 
correlative responsibility of the trust ethos is to invite and enable dissent; not only in the 
representative institutions designed for this purpose, but also in the specific relationship in 




which it occurs. In deeply diverse societies, it is only through the dissent of those who are 
suffering from injustices that others can learn of the way that the interdependent 
relationships in which they participate are harming these relatives, as, for example, in 
their producing and consuming relationships. Moreover, when the dissent is enacted in 
the specific relationship in which the suffering occurs, as, for example, strikes and 
boycotts, it has the potential to open that relationship, which is usually a type of power-
over, to dialogue and contestation, and thus to democratisation from within. These direct 
forms of dissent often require the support of those not directly affected to move the 
powers-that-be to listen and hear what is being said. For these reasons, dissent is seen as a 
gift, and encouraging it as a fitting reciprocity. This is not to agree or disagree with 
particular cases, but to make possible a fair hearing by being open to it in a trusting way. 
 
4.3 Receptivity: the step of nonattachment 
 
The next step is to be receptive: to present the dissent or, reciprocally, to listen so as to 
hear the social suffering that is being presented; to recognize it for what it is. This is 
arguably the most difficult step to learn. Although suffering an injustice and hearing of an 
injustice in which one may be complicit are very different (as we see at the end of this 
section), both are often perceived as disruptive of social relationships. In each case, in 
different ways, one’s mode of being is experienced as disrupted by another, discordant 
mode of being (Howes 2009: 74–97). There are two general types of response: nonviolent 
and violent. The nonviolent response is to mobilise the resources within one’s co-
operational trust, in the virtuous social relationships, and in one’s cooperative and 




contestatory ethos, to present or respond trustingly – to offer the gift of trust in one’s 
comportment. The violent response overrides a trusting response. Let’s examine this first 
as it is more familiar. 
The violent response is a mostly non-reflective bodily counter-disposition to 
respond aggressively: with anger or fear in dissenting response to suffering and with 
angry or haughty denial, dismissal or discredit in response to dissent. This dynamic of 
knee-jerk reaction and counter-reaction is hardened if the injustice, dissent and response 
occur in deeply diverse societies that are caught up in the war system and its domestic 
effects described above, as most are. The dissent and the response tend to come to 
cognition and expression in terms of ‘stereotypes’. A stereotype in this sense is a way of 
recognizing and representing oneself and the other that is given by the associations to 
which one belongs, and one’s subject positions within them; as an identity and a 
contrastive identity of those who do not. It separates them and draws lines of enmity 
rather than amity for them. Moreover, as Bohm argues, it is not only or primarily 
discursive; it is woven into one’s emotions, dispositions, ways of behaving and relating to 
others. It is a view projected onto the world and a way of acting and interacting within it. 
This whole habitual apparatus does the responding for us. It is even possible and not 
uncommon, especially in cases of racism, sexism and xenophobia, to put on a quite 
different public face when challenged, while nevertheless being conducted in one’s 
conduct by the covert, embodied force of the stereotype (Bohm 2010: 52–9). 
If we give in to this dynamic we are on our way to a vicious cycle that can lead 
from stereotyping and misrecognition, through the escalating to and fro of aggressive 
interaction to physical and systemic violence and war. In Practicing Peace in Times of 




War, Chodron describes this dynamic disposition in the following way (Chodron 2006: 
55–6): 
 
[The Tibetan word ‘shenpa’] points to a familiar experience that is at the root of all 
conflict, all cruelty, oppression, and greed. The usual translation is ‘attachment’, but 
this doesn’t adequately express the full meaning. I think of shenpa as ‘getting 
hooked’. Another definition is…the ‘charge’ – the charge behind our thoughts and 
words and actions, the charge behind ‘like and don’t like’… [For example] 
somebody says a harsh word and immediately you feel a shift. There’s a tightening 
that rapidly spirals into mentally blaming this person, or wanting revenge, or 
blaming yourself. Then you speak and act. The charge behind the tightening, behind 
the urge, behind the story line or action is shenpa. 
 
Stereotypes of ourselves and others become closed views in order to secure 
ourselves from the discordant way of being of the other. Each member’s perspectival 
view of the intersubjective world becomes instead a presumptively comprehensive view 
of an omni-subjective world – the solipsistic world of distrust. A growing attitude of self-
righteousness reinforces the presumptive rightness of their worldview and their ‘heart 
hardens’. The other responds in kind; setting in motion the sort of vicious antagonistic 
cycle of mutual misunderstanding diagnosed by Nietzsche. If we bear in mind the 
complex interweaving and interplay of human interaction given by Follett and others 
earlier, we can see that this kind of response can irrupt in any social relationships 
whatsoever, even in the most intimate relationships when one partner misunderstands or 




unwittingly insults the other. If it not reconciled by the ethos of trust, it can spiral out of 
control. 
Accordingly, to practice peace and trust in times of war it is necessary to cultivate 
a counter-disposition that enables people to detach themselves from the ‘charge’ of the 
stereotypes given to them by their subject positions in deep diversity before they can 
begin to listen and hear. This involves the difficult work of reconnecting with and 
drawing on the resources that the ‘charge’ overrides (the resources of intersubjective and 
ethical trust of the first type of response); or, better yet, cultivating the ethos of trust so it 
withstands the charge in the first instance. Chodron gives a number of ethical practices 
that enable practitioners to withstand or detach and reconnect, and, thereby, open their 
hearts to the other: courage to wait, patience, living with insecurity, meditation, and 
compassionate abiding. These solitary practices can be more powerful than shenpa, but 
not without mutual aid of the dialogical resources discussed below. The first step is 
simply coming to realize that aggression begins with the individual being emotionally 
catapulted into the kneejerk distrustful reaction – a reaction that separates humans, 
overrides and effaces their background interdependency and intersubjective trust, and 
positions them as antagonists. That is, it places them in the classic modern political scene 
of mutual distrust and presents it as primordial. It effaces the lifeworld it disrupts, just as 
the vicious social systems it generates efface the underlying symbiotic social systems on 
which they depend. 
 Merleau-Ponty provides a crucial insight into this phenomenon (Merleau-Ponty 
1962: 355): 
 




With the cogito begins the struggle between consciousnesses, each one of which, as 
Hegel says, seeks the death of the other. For the struggle ever to begin, and for each 
consciousness to be capable of suspecting alien presences which it negates, all must 
necessarily have some common ground and be mindful of their peaceful co-
existence in the world of childhood. 
 
I take Merleau-Ponty to mean that dominant theories and practices of human struggles 
begin with ‘stereotypes’ of mutual distrust as if they are primordial. It is only once we 
cognize and re-cognize another living being as an alien and suspicious (untrustable) 
consciousness in threatening relation to ourselves as a separate consciousness (the 
‘cogito’ effect) that the various types of antagonistic struggles for existence, recognition 
and so on follow. And, crucially, taking this as our fundamental way of being in the world 
overlooks, overrides and undermines what lies beneath it in the lived experience of 
human beings: the intersubjective and interdependent ‘common ground’ and the shared 
experience of “their peaceful co-existence in the world of childhood.” The peaceful co-
existence in the world of childhood is his description of co-operational trust (Section 3). 
Rather than letting themselves be interpolated into violent struggles, they have the 
capabilities to be “mindful of” this intersubjective common ground of co-operational 
savoir-faire, to connect or re-connect with it, and to enact it in a trusting, truthful and 
cooperative way of interacting with each other. This human capacity to draw on the 
intersubjective trust of childhood in adulthood “remains an indispensable acquisition 
underlying that of maturity, if there is to be for the adult one single intersubjective world” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 354). The capacity to draw on this ground of trust, and on the lived 




experience of co-operative ecological and social relationships of intersubjective trust in 
which it is enacted, varies enormously. Nevertheless, it exists and is the condition of an 
intersubjective and peaceful world.8 
Now, what is the ethical difference in responses between those suffering injustice 
and those responsible or complicit for it? As we saw in the section on means and ends, all 
parties have good and compelling ethical and pragmatic reasons to respond by being 
peaceful, trustful and just. This nonviolent mode of being is the ground of bringing about 
peace, trust and justice more widely. However, there are crucial differences between 
them. Actors responsible for injustice and interdependent bystanders who are often 
complicit beneficiaries of the injustice seem to me to have unconditional responsibilities 
(response-abilities) to offer the gift of trust openly, nonviolently and truthfully. Even 
when they receive an aggressive dissent from those suffering injustice they surely have a 
duty to turn the other cheek and try again and again. They should see this rebuke as a gift 
that enables them, depending on their ethical tradition, to exercise their forgiveness, 
mercy, magnanimity, or the courage of truthfulness: to live up to the platitudes they 
espouse.   
While the oppressed have the same, compelling means-ends reasons to dissent 
nonviolently, they do not seem to me to have an unconditional responsibility to do so. 
How many persons have the courage and discipline of a Gandhi, King or Thich Nhat 
Hahn to be prepared to die but never to kill; to “perish rather than hate and fear”? If the 
oppressed dissent aggressively it is up to the oppressors and the complicit to understand 
where this is coming from and to respond with the courage of compassion until they gain 
their trust. In the world of violence, exploitation, lies and repression by the powers-that-




be, to demand that the oppressed take the first nonviolent step is the all too familiar 
unethical and cowardly pretext for the repression that follows.  
Yet, despite all the power-over piled up to silence or provoke them, the oppressed 
are usually the ones who bring nonviolence, trust and justice into the world in their 
organisations. They are usually met initially with agents provocateurs, violent repression 
and media propaganda of the powers-that-be. Persistent well-organised, nonviolent 
collective action of the oppressed in response gradually dissolves the authority of 
command and moves complicit bystanders and even some members of the ruling class to 
support them; thereby tipping the dynamics in favour of nonviolent negotiations of the 
injustice, as we have seen in nonviolent regime change in recent years (Kurlansky 2006; 
Horsburgh 1968; Schell 2003; Ackermann and Duvall 2000; Martin 2001; Sharp 2010; 
Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Tully 2012; and Section 4.5).  
  
4.4 Two (contentious) examples 
 
The importance of upholding the trustful virtue of truthfulness (parrhesia) can be 
illustrated with two (contentious) political and economic examples. The first illustrates 
the destructive consequences of appearing to make promises yet not following up on 
them. In the 1980 referendum campaign in Quebec the YES side led by Premier Lévesque 
put forward a proposal for a new kind of relationship with the rest of Canada in a 
paradigmatically trustful manner. The proposal was for ‘sovereignty-association’ in 
which the continuing association with Canada was as important as the sovereignty of 
Quebec. It called for two referenda: the first to give Premier Lévesque the authority to 




proceed to negotiate sovereignty and association with all affected in the rest of Canada 
and the second to put the result of the negotiations to the people of Quebec.9 He defended 
the rights of minorities in Quebec, especially the Anglophone minority, and the First 
Nations, and the YES campaign was widely grounded in the social and economic 
cooperative associations in Quebec.  
During the campaign, the NO side led by Prime Minister Trudeau countered by 
appearing to say, and leading many citizens to believe, they would negotiate a new 
relationship with Quebec within Canada. After the NO side won, not only did the Prime 
Minister and federal government not recognize Quebec in the constitutional change that 
followed in The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; the Charter was brought into 
force without the consent, and over the explicit dissent of the majority of representatives 
in the Quebec National Assembly. Quebec federalist and ‘sovereignist’ governments ever 
since have protested this injustice and demanded negotiations in good faith.10 But, the 
failures to follow up on commitments and to gain the consent of Quebec people, 
undermined the trust generated by the two-step proposal of the YES side and generated a 
culture of distrust. Despite two decades of negotiations to ‘bring Quebec in with dignity’, 
the distrust and suspicion generated in Quebec and throughout Canada has made this 
impossible. It set in motion a vicious dynamic of spin and counter-spin, suspicion and 
counter-suspicion, and pervasive distrust of governments and negotiations in general on 
both sides: a culture of “incertitude” (Gagnon 2014).  There is an obvious general lesson 
in this, as well as a specific lesson for the NO side in the recent Scottish referendum on 
independence, since they too made similar promises in the campaign. 




The second (contentious) example is the ‘dissimulation of trust’ in non-
democratised market relationships. Neo-liberal capitalism promotes an anti-social ethos 
that is the antithesis of the cooperative and co-sustaining ethos. It promotes and rewards 
ruthless competition to maximize profits by any means possible, including exploiting 
natural resources (the living earth) and human resources (human beings) at the lowest cost 
in order to win the competition. The constitutive problem of such vicious systems is that 
they cannot generate trust among the members because they never know when the other 
will take advantage of them. It is seemingly individually rational and collectively 
irrational to distrust others. The attempts to solve this problem with laws that force 
compliance in the absence of trust just generate ruthless competition over legislation and 
within whatever laws are passed. These economic systems depend upon pre-existing and 
co-existing social associations of intersubjective and co-operational trust to hold them 
together, but, at the same time, their anti-social ethos erodes this social ‘capital’ (as they 
call trust), pitting individuals and communities against one another in order to survive, 
and thus destroying the conditions on which social life depends. 
To try to solve this performative contradiction at the core of radical distrust 
systems, the competitors develop a clever ethos of dissimulating trustfulness and its 
virtues. They appear to be everything the ethos of trust embodies in order to gain the 
confidence, and so the cooperation, of others, all the while continuing aggressive 
competition behind the appearance of trustworthiness. This is the duplicitous world of 
marketing – of oneself, products, corporations, political parties, movements, and so on. 
The theory is that the powerful can get away with this confidence game by being a “great 
feigner and dissembler”, as Machiavelli put it, because the people are easily deceived and 




they judge by “appearances” and “results”; not by the vicious means going on behind the 
manufactured scene (Machiavelli 1988: 62–3). But, as Rousseau and Melville replied, this 
is not the case. People see through the appearances and they experience the vicious 
results. While the “confidence men” become more powerful and wealthy, the majority 
become poorer and insecure. The consequences are radical distrust, class war, social 
disintegration, protests and revolutions (Rousseau 1994; Melville 1989).  
This destructive dynamic was exposed to all in the financial crisis of 2008, the 
bailouts of the banks and corporations that caused it, and the austerity programs, de-
regulation of markets and resource extraction, and deepening indebtedness that followed. 
People could see the massive and growing inequality locally and globally and the 
destruction of social and ecological relationships. There have been three types of response 
to the crisis. Some become cynical or ironical and play the con game themselves 
(deepening the crisis); others disengage from the dominant economic system and engage 
with local and global cooperative socio-economic cooperatives, small businesses, and fair 
trade; and others organise cooperatively to transform the dominant vicious system by 
nonviolent and trustful means. The latter two have learned the basic lesson from the 
performative contradiction of the vicious system: means are constitutive of ends and 
hence only trustful means can regenerate trustful ends (Gregg 2018: 149; Gandhi 1968: 
151; Section 4.7 below). 
 
4.5 Compassion and Empathy 
 




The ethics of listening and speaking in deeply diverse societies raises a whole set of 
complex questions that I cannot go into here. Fortunately, there is a lot of good literature 
on this in GRSP and elsewhere. I wish to mention just a few ethical implications that 
relate directly to trust and distrust. It is undeniable that if all the affected individual and 
collective members of deeply diverse societies wish to share an intersubjective world of 
peaceful cooperation, contestation and co-sustainability, rather than a concatenation of 
mutually distrustful and fractious subjective associations, then they have to understand 
each other in their own terms to some extent. This is acknowledged in the duty to listen 
(audi alteram partem) and the ‘duty to consult all affected’ or at least a subset (the 
official stakeholders). However, this reciprocal responsibility is more demanding than is 
often assumed (Maclure and Taylor 2013; Kompridis 2013; Karmis 2014).  
Listening, coming to understand and responding appropriately to injustice and 
suffering of fellow human beings involves two dispositional abilities of the trusting ethos. 
The first is the compassion that underlies the whole virtuous ethos of co-operational trust 
and moves the person to be concerned and care for the well-being of his or her relations in 
diversely appropriate ways. Compassion encompasses more than justice. It is the savoir-
faire of being-with the other (Mitsein) in their suffering (Mitleiden) and in the way to 
well-being (Mitfreude) (Nietzsche 2001: s.338). Compassion in this sense is the threshold 
condition of any kind of ethical ethos of being in the world with others. Compassion, like 
trust, seems on the one hand to presuppose awareness of interdependency, yet, on the 
other hand, the concerted practice of compassion, like trust, brings interdependency to 
self-awareness, and this motivates further compassion. (Dalai Lama 2012: 41–72).   




The exercise of compassion in particular cases requires empathy to understand the 
lived experience of the injustice and suffering from the perspective of the individual or 
group subjected to the injustice. Empathy involves the imaginary movement of 
transposition of myself into your place, and the perspectival understanding of you as 
another to me, and of me as another to you (mutual self and other understanding); and 
these movements bring into being the concrete ethical perception of you as an ethical 
being like me (ethical perception). This is the reciprocal re-perception and re-cognition 
that occurs in deep listening and speaking in turn. The listener is freed from their 
stereotypical mis-perception and mis-cognition of the suffering of others as separate and 
of no concern: mis-recognition. And, he or she moves around to re-perceive and re-
cognize the lived experience of the suffering other human being, class, minority and so 
on. Insofar as this is (asymmetrically) reciprocal, the suffering partner goes through a 
similar transposition and they begin a dialogue towards ‘mutual’ recognition and 
understanding (Tully 2016).  
It is literally impossible to know how to treat another with respect or dignity, or to 
do unto them as you would have them do unto you in similar circumstances, as all ethical 
systems require, unless one begins to understand their suffering in this emphatic way 
(Thompson 2007: 382–413; Irlbacher-Fox 2009). To proceed to respond to injustices 
through the misrecognizing and misunderstanding stereotypes of the subject positions of 
one’s associations (class, gender, religion, office) with superficial consultation and 
apologies is just to add further insult to injury, and thus trigger shenpa and cascading 
struggles and cycles of misrecognition that plague Canada and other diverse societies 
(Murphy 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014). 







The mobilization of co-operational trust, compassion, empathy, understanding and 
reciprocity takes place in dialogical relationships in the broad sense of dialogue 
developed in the dialogue tradition (Buber 2002; Bohm 2014; Temelini 2014). Dialogue 
in this phenomenological sense includes five very general types of both non-reflective 
and reflective participatory and interactive relationship. These are: the kinds of perceptual 
and intuitive interactions humans have with the living world in every breath they take 
(Abram 1997: 89–92); the perceptual, embodied interactions with other human beings; 
the ethical relationship we have with ourselves through which we become ethical agents; 
the linguistic kinds of interactions they have with each other that draw on these and 
involve senses, emotions, intuitions and language; and dialogues of communion that draw 
on all these but go beyond language to the spiritual realm (and deep religious diversity). 
Once all types of interactions are included in the field of study, it is possible to 
address not only conflicts among partners who are in agreement in their shared form of 
life (shallow diversity), but also conflicts that arise from conflicting underlying forms of 
life and relationships to the living earth and the spiritual realm (deep diversity): that is, 
conflicts over the second quality of virtuous social relationships (Section 2.2). 
Consequently, the repertoire of linguistic and behavioural modes of nonviolent, trustful 
and conciliatory interaction that are used to persuade and move a violent or intransigent 
partner into the space of specific dialogues of negotiation are themselves also dialogical 
relationships in this fundamental sense. These Gandhian and post-Gandhian autotelic 




means of interaction are called nonviolent agonistics or “moral jiu-jitsu” (Gregg 2018: 
49-58; Tully 2018c: xli-lxi).   
 The trusting ethos invites and enables the voicing of dissent and dialogues of 
contestation over the suffering and injustices of the complex social relationships humans 
inhabit. This is where compassionate and empathetic listening and speaking take place. 
These are the familiar critical dialogues of demands and counter-demands, proposals and 
counter-proposals, arguing and bargaining, agreeing and disagreeing, acting together, 
losing trust, falling apart, starting again – world without end. In the course of the 
reciprocal criticism of the demands and counter-demands, the background prejudices, 
stereotypes and comprehensive doctrines are gradually called into the space of questions 
and examined.  This is painful and it takes a kind of trustful courage to present criticism 
of others and withstand criticism of your own prejudices in the right way. These critical 
exchanges are a form of reciprocal enlightenment that can only occur in dialogue: where 
the partners reciprocally enlighten each other as to the partial and non-comprehensive 
character of their own and others’ view of their shared world (Wiener 2014; Laden 2012; 
Tully 2016).  
Moreover, these contestatory dialogues are, at the same time, the exchange of 
perspectival background stories or traditions within the horizons of which the various 
members make sense of their demands and the counter-demands of others and the 
corrections in their self-understandings that the criticisms force on them. This exchange 
of diverse background stories gradually brings to light and awareness the overlapping and 
criss-crossing intersubjective and interdependent world they always already share in 
common, yet inhabit diversely. This experience is not consensus on a meta-story. Rather, 




it is diversity-awareness of being in a shared intersubjective world that is co-sustained by 
the very way they are participating in the critical and self-critical dialogue and relating to 
each other. Through dialogue, as Merleau-Ponty and Sousa Santos argue, light dawns 
slowly over the common intersubjective world we already inhabit and sharable 
‘commonalities’ begin to appear (Sousa Santos 2005). This is the original meaning of 
‘dialogue’: through participation (dia) in linguistic dialogue (logos) we bring before us 
the world we are talking about (Bohm 2010: 6–8, 87–9).  
Of course, the world revealed in these open and critical dialogues of reciprocal 
elucidation is deeply unequal and structured by power-over relationships and vicious 
social systems that dominate the present. It would be impossible to address suffering and 
injustice if this dimension of the present were not brought to light; and critical dialogue 
does this in a way that monological critique cannot hope to do. Moreover, such dialogues 
also bring into being a virtuous system of cooperative and contestatory relationships of 
intersubjective trust among the partners and disclose the background intersubjective 
social relationships on which it is based. It brings the three types of trust to self-awareness 
and the participants’ role in co-sustaining them. And this provides the common ground 
for addressing suffering and injustice. 
 
4.7 Mistrust and distrust 
 
Virtuous systems of cooperative and contestatory relationships that enable these broad 
kinds of critical dialogue present a challenge to a specific kind of epistemic distrust. This 
epistemic distrust is the subjective distrust that one partner has to another based on good 




reasons derived from the evidence available about the partner’s behaviour. All social 
systems, including virtuous ones, involve some partners who interact viciously in order to 
get what they want. They lie, cheat, con, trick, free ride, manipulate, bribe, make false 
promises, commitments and apologies, pretend to be trustworthy, fail to carry through, 
and so on. The evidence clearly suggests that such partners are untrustworthy and other 
partners have reasons to distrust them on these grounds. 
 The ethos of trust does not support the activities of making and expressing 
judgements of distrust of this kind. Rather, the character of judgment in these cases is also 
shaped by one’s knowledge of the background conditions of intersubjective trust, co-
operational trust, and generating subjective trust. It brings into play the kind of judgment 
called ‘mistrust’ for the following reasons. An unqualified judgment of distrust implies 
certainty and definitiveness. It separates the judge from the judged, often implying that he 
or she can live without this partner and, should they meet again, they will be met with 
more than suspicion. It seems to lack compassion as well any residual trust, and thus fails 
to sustain trust. It indicates a hardening heart in Chodron’s sense. 
 The partner upholding a trusting ethos judges in a more tempered and conciliatory 
way, consistent with their duty to sustain the relationships that sustain intersubjective trust 
as much as possible. Their judgment is one of mistrust. Although this term is used 
interchangeably with ‘distrust’, it has a different grammar that give expression precisely 
to the conciliatory ethos that is necessary in these circumstances (Lenard 2012: 14–37, 
58–61). ‘Mistrust’ is like ‘misjudgement’, ‘misunderstand’, ‘misplace’, ‘misinterpret’, 
‘misrepresent’, and so on. It says that the partner appears to be untrustworthy, but it also 
implies the qualification that this judgment might be mistaken or based on a 




misunderstanding, and that the person making the judgment hopes this is the case (for 
example, that the partner judged was acting out of character or in circumstances the judge 
does not know about). Even if the judgment is correct, the voicing of the judgment of 
mistrust is a conciliatory invitation to change: it leaves open and encourages the 
possibility that the partner judged will change his or her ways. This well-known 
diplomatic tone and implication indicates to the partner that their correction of the 
judgment, if it is a misjudgment, or of their behaviour, if it is correct, will be welcomed, 
and that they will be welcomed back into the virtuous social relationship as a trusted 
partner. Mistrust judges the behaviour of the person or group in a redeemable way, not in 
an irredeemable and reciprocally distrustful manner. It also shows how carefully enacted 
and cautious virtuous means can work their conciliatory power on vicious partners and 
save the relationship from spiralling out of control. 
 The most radical sense of ‘mistrust’ occurs when a person is fully aware that the 
other person is distrustful yet always acts in truthful and trustful ways towards them. In 
the narrow sense of judging a person by their actions alone, their trust appears to be 
mistaken and misplaced; hence ‘mistrust’. Yet the ethical person knows that if they 
reciprocate with distrust the conflict will escalate into a vicious cycle, as we have seen in 
sections 4.1 and 4.4. They realize that the only way to generate or bring about trustfulness 
in in the distrustful person is to act and react truthfully and trustfully, come what may, 
and as difficult and courageous as that may be. ‘Distrust is a weakness’ as Gandhi 
succinctly puts it (Gandhi 1968: 306-307). This is a fundamental principle of the 
philosophy and practice of nonviolent conflict resolution (Gregg 2018: 49-58, 149).  
 




4.8 Reasoning-with and acting-with diverse partners 
 
What, finally, is the trustful ethos of reasoning together and acting together when diverse 
members of diverse associations come together to address an injustice in the way set out 
so far? The first distinctive feature is that the constructive dialogue is like a big 
smorgasbord. Each member brings the gift of their perspectival view of the injustice and 
how it might be resolved fairly and acceptably from their perspective. Each gift enables 
others to disclose their shared intersubjective world from a perspective concealed from 
their viewpoint. The mutual exchange enlarges the view of each and they see the labyrinth 
of criss-crossing relationships of interdependency in which they live. A feeling of mutual 
gratitude arises among them and this strengthens mutual trust, care and goodwill.  
 This provides the basis for the emergence of an ethos of ‘distributed intelligence’. 
Distributed intelligence is the defining feature of ethical reasoning under the orientation 
of the all affected principle (Section 2.1). The members begin to consider not only what is 
best for themselves or their primary association of identification. They begin to see that to 
be ethical members of the intersubjective diverse world they inhabit, they must consider 
what is best for all affected members, human and non-human, from their perspectives, 
and for the symbiotic ethical community as a whole that this comprises (Leopold 1953: 
237–64). No one person is in command and no one procedure of negotiation dominates. 
As in improvisation in jazz, to which distributed intelligence is often compared, each 
participant acts freely in being guided by concerns for themselves, others and the whole; 
agreeing and disagreeing as they go along. This is the unique power of mutual trust, co-




operational trust and intersubjective trust working together (Macy and Johnstone 2012: 
99–100).  
 The power of trust is a creative power. It brings something new into the world in 
these difficult critical dialogues: namely, a solution they did not and could not see before. 
What makes this possible is that, prior to this moment, they were expending all their 
energy in conflict and Hegelian struggles of trying to gain power over others or to force a 
compromise. Now they are exercising all their energy together in trying to resolve the 
problem at hand in cooperative and contestatory ways. The technical term is ‘integration’ 
but I do not think this captures the complexity or creativity of it (Greg 2018: 65-66). It is 
reciprocal elucidation and symbiogenesis: bringing to light new ways of seeing the 
relationships in which we are entangled and of acting together in and on them. 
 This mode of reasoning together and acting together does not generate consensus 
or perfect solutions. Resolutions are imperfect and thus always open to review, dissent, 
re-contestation and re-negotiation in the future. “Á la prochaine,” as Premier Lévesque 
knew and the Supreme Court reaffirmed, is a constitutive feature of all virtuous social 
systems, and must always be invoked and responded to honestly. This open-ended or 
‘non-finality’ feature renders resolutions acceptable at the time to those members who do 
not get everything they want, yet are mindful that this shortcoming enables other 
suffering members to get the response they need.11 
 This way of reasoning together gives the participants the experience and pleasure 
of acting together; of power-with relationships. And they can convey this experience to 
the people they represent if they consult with them in the same reciprocal way. That is to 
say, as Laden argues in detail, the most important feature of this unique kind of reasoning 




together is not the specific responses to injustice it generates, as important as they surely 
are, since we also need to be open to seeing their imperfections in the future. Rather, the 
most important feature is the nonviolent and trustful, autotelic way that brings about the 




For many of us associated with GRSP, the symbol of this trustful way of collective life in 
conditions of deep diversity is the monumental sculpture by Haida artist Bill Reid and a 
group of indigenous and non-indigenous fellow-carvers, The Spirit of Haida.  The thirteen 
members of this famous canoe manifest diverse ways of life. They are contesting for 
recognition and rearrangement of positions in the canoe; and Raven, the trickster, is 
steering. The only means they have to conciliate or reconciliate their disputes is to pass 
around the talking stick held by the chief in the center. That is, they are constrained to 
govern themselves and resolve disputes co-freely by exchanging stories and reasoning 
together. Yet, for all that contestation and discord, they are paddling together and carrying 
on co-sustaining and co-evolving their diverse ways of life (Bringhurst 1992; Tully 1995). 
The spirit of Haida Gwaii is thus the complex kind of interdependent freedom we have 
been discussing: an “association, in which the free development of each is the condition 
for the free development of all.” In his remarkable study of the Canadian constitution, 
Webber argues that the complex Canadian constitution – at its best – approximates this 
spirit of “agonistic constitutionalism” (Webber 2015).  




 This great symbol of the deep diversity of indigenous and settler Canada adorns 
Canadian museums, airports, the Canadian consulate in Washington DC, and, until 
recently, the twenty dollar bill. In 2012 it was removed from the twenty dollar bill and 
replaced with the military symbol of Vimy Ridge. Abu Laban suggests that this represents 
the systematic turn that the federal government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
took to dismantle support for social systems of intersubjective, cooperative-contestatory 
trust and reassert the politics of competitive distrust (Abu Laban 2014). If so, then this 
chapter may be helpful in seeing our situation more clearly – as a contest over these two 
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1 I use the term ‘virtuous’ in two senses. First, drawing on living systems theory, it 
designates interactions that tend to sustain the well-being of the system of living 
relationships and its members. This general sense of ‘virtuous’ provides the core of all 
sustainable living systems, including human systems. Second, I use ‘virtuous’ in the 
ethical sense to designate the ethos (actions and interactions) that, in addition to the core 
shared by all forms of life, sustains specifically human systems. I use the term ‘vicious’ in 
the two contrasting senses: for interactions that tend to render living relationships 
destructive and unsustainable in general and ethically vicious in the specific case of 
human relationships. 
2 By GRSP I mean my own interpretation of the research of GRSP and associates. 
3 I discuss these six features in more detail in Tully (2008a). See also Wiener 2014. 
4 The analysis of trust in the following sections is deeply indebted to the work of 
Mohandas Gandhi and Richard Bartlett Gregg on trust. See Gregg 2018. 
 
5 For example, this ‘power-with’ dissolution dynamic was illustrated in the Egyptian 
Spring (2011), the popular assemblies in Spain (2011-2014), and the pro-democracy 
                                                             




                                                                                                                                                                                      
protests in Hong Kong (2014). I discuss these three types of power relationship in more 
detail in Tully (2014: 3–102; Tully 2018b). 
6 The diffusion thesis is associated with Franz Boas and his work with Indigenous people 
in North America (Tully 2018c). 
7 The first European to articulate the security dilemma was Montesquieu in 1748. Among 
the most influential formulations of it in non-technical terms in recent decades was Schell 
(1984). For an outstanding recent critical analysis of the dilemma and its historical 
reconstruction see Havercroft (2011: 198–206).  
8 Hegel makes the same basic point in The Philosophy of Mind that Merleau-Ponty makes 
here in The Phenomenology of Perception: these struggles are not the basic human 
condition. 
9 The 1980 YES side approach of negotiating with all affected was later endorsed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC 1998). 
10 The term ‘sovereignist’ for the independence party is misleading since the federalist 
party and all Canadians accept the sovereignty of Quebec. The two referenda of 1980 and 
1995 presuppose and confirm that the people of Quebec are sovereign and hence have the 
right to choose independence. In both referenda the sovereign people of Quebec have 
decided to exercise their powers of self-determination within the Canadian federation 
(and contest to reform it) rather than exercise these powers in an independent state. For 
this important distinction see Tuck (2015), Gagnon (2014), Gagnon and Tully (2001: 1–
33). 




                                                                                                                                                                                      
11 The Supreme Court of Canada endorsed this principle of ‘always a next time’ or ‘we 
look forward to meeting again’ in the Reference re the Secession of Quebec in 1998. 
Their phrase is ‘dissent is inevitable’ (SCC 1998, Tully 2000, Webber 2015). 
12 I discuss these types of dialogue in more detail in Tully 2016. 
 
13 For immensely helpful comments, I am indebted to Quentin Skinner, Anthony Laden, 
David Owen, Dimitrios Karmis, Cressida Heyes, Jonathan Havercroft, Alain-G. Gagnon, 
Avigail Eisenberg, Dennis Dalton and John Borrows. 
